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POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND GENDER
DURING TIMES OF TRANSITION
FIONNUALA NI AOLAIN*
At the heart of transitional justice discourse is an ongoing
conversation about accountability for human rights violations that occur in a
context of regime repression or violent conflict. That accountability
dialogue has generally been preoccupied with attempts to define the forms
of political violence that should be addressed by various formal and
informal mechanisms, such as trials and other truth-seeking processes. This
Article will examine the multiple ways in which transitional justice
processes have conceptualized political violence, and how that maps onto a
gendered understanding of violence experiences and accountability
mechanisms in a transitional context.
In general, greater scrutiny of the neutrality of the transitional
project has led to a more critical appraisal of the gendered aspects of
transition.' The premise of this inquiry is that accepted discourses in
transitional societies surrounding the nature and form of political violence,
as well as the legal accounting for such violence, has been deeply gendered.
Specific to this inquiry is the characterization of certain kinds of violent
action as linked to the conflict and/or the repressive regime, and the
exclusion of other forms of violence from within the definitional boundary.
Defining political violence often becomes a contest between opposing
political factions as to whose acts of violence are to be defined as
"political" (and thus justifiable) and whose are not (and remain subject to
ordinary criminal sanction).
* Professor of Law, Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster; Dorsey &
Whitney Chair in Law, University of Minnesota Law School. My thanks to Christine Bell,
Niamh Reilly, Martha Fineman and Beverly Balos for comments on earlier versions of this
work. This work would not have been completed without the research assistance of
Catherine Turner, Adrienne Reilly, and Jennifer Johnson. All faults remaining lie with the
author.
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Bell, Women and the Problems of Peace Agreements: Strategiesfor

Change, in WOMEN, PEACE-MAKING AND CONSTITUTIONS (Radhika Coomeraswamy ed.,
2004) [hereinafter Bell, Strategiesfor Change]; Christine Bell et al. , Justice Discourses in
Transition, 13 J. Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 305 (2004) [hereinafter Bell, Justice Discourses in
Transition].
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Further, underpinning this approach is the understanding that peace
processes and processes of political change which prompt or underlie
transitional moment(s) are profoundly gendered. For example, "while
women have often been at the forefront of peace initiatives throughout a
conflict," men "predominantly, if not exclusively," negotiate peace
agreements. 2 The conduct of violence and war is predominantly male,
leading to a male bias in negotiations.3 This continues today, despite the
Platform for Action that emerged from the Fourth World Conference on
Women in Beijing in 1995, which asserted that, "in addressing armed or
other conflicts, an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender
perspective into all policies and programmes should be promoted so that
before decisions are taken an analysis is made of the effects on women and
men, respectively."4 The Beijing Platform approach has been confirmed by
the highly visible U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325, which "urges
[U.N.] Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all
decision-making levels ...

for the prevention, management and resolution

of conflict." 5 Its requirements are framed by the acknowledgement that
women play an important role in "the prevention and resolution of conflict
and in peace-building," and that women and6 children "constitute the vast
majority of those affected by armed conflict."
This Article reviews the relationship between the legal and political
aspects of political violence from the starting point that the gendered nature
of transition is positively correlated to the violent masculinities that
dominate in times of conflict. Hence, the forms of accountability sought in
the post-conflict/post-regime environment reflect the gender biases that
2

Christine Bell et al., JusticeDiscourses in Transition,supra note 1, at 321 (citing

Bell, Strategiesfor Change, supra note 1, at 98).
3 KELLY-DAWN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (1997); JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN, WAR AND GENDER:
How GENDER SHAPES THE WAR SYSTEM AND VICE VERSA (2001); NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS,
GENDER & NATION (1997).

4 Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women,
141, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 177/20/REV. 1 (Sept. 1995), availableat http://www.un.org/womenwatch/confer/b
eijing/reports/.
5 S.C. Res. 1325, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/sc2000.htm.
6

Id. See generally Jessica Neuwirth, Women and Peace and Security: The

Implementation of U.N. Security Resolution 1325, 9

DUKE

J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 253 (2002).
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manifest in the prior context. This Article broadly argues that these biases
are problematic as a matter of equality and accountability. They result in an
accountability approach that stops short of naming certain forms of violence
as violations.7 The effect of this approach is pronounced for women; the
violence experienced by women is generally deemed irrelevant to or outside
the frame of accountability for many post-conflict and post-regime
societies.8
Moreover' the Article asserts that, when violence is understood in
specific and narrow ways, it affects broader understandings of which
concerns become issues for negotiation and mediation purposes. Arguably,
the dual effect of such exclusions is that the scope of problems to be
resolved is limited by a male conception of conflict and its biased effects
revolving around allocations of power and territory. This limited scope can
have substantial effects on the reorganization of political and legal power,
and their institutional manifestations, that occurs in transitional contexts,
whether by peace treaty negotiation, constitutional settlement, or informal
political power change. In these contexts, the matters that are framed as
central issues for resolution in transitional negotiations may only
peripherally impact many women's day-to-day lives. Negotiators may leave
untouched socioeconomic exclusions (which may themselves constitute
violent experiences for women), and other forms of violence, which women
may not see as compartmentalised into "conflict" and "non-conflict."
Rather, women may experience forms of violence on a9 continuum, only
partially addressed, or not addressed at all, by cease-fires.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I examines what is
generally understood by the term "political violence." Part II explores the
forms of violence that women experience during conflict and/or regime
repression with an emphasis on the relationship between the conflict and/or
regime and women's experiences of violence. Part III briefly outlines the
forms of harms that are given hierarchical significance in truth-telling
processes, and the resulting legal and political significance. In conclusion,
the Article reflects upon the nature of forms of violence that shape the

7 Bell, Strategiesfor Change, supra note 1, at 99.
8 Laura Grenfell, The Participationof Afghan Women in the Reconstruction

Process, 12 HuM. RTS. BR. 22, 22-25 (2004).
9 CYNTHIA COCKBuRN, THE SPACE BETWEEN Us: NEGOTIATING GENDER AND
NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN CONFLICT 8 (1999).
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responses of transitional justice discourse and to which it in turn is
responsive.
I. WHAT DO WE MEAN BY THE TERM "POLITICAL
VIOLENCE"?
Political violence is an extremely broad and multifaceted term. It is
also an "essentially contested concept,"10 with boundaries and meanings
that shift depending on cultural and community-specific circumstances.
This section will explore some of the orthodox explanations of the term and
the interface of these understandings with transitional justice discourse.
A. Definitional Problems
As a strict matter of academic definition, the concept of political
violence is subject to ongoing and intensive interpretation. The term has
been defined in a number of ways and a concrete, universal definition
remains elusive. I I However, there are some general markers that can be
10 See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, in THE IMPORTANCE OF

LANGUAGE 121 (Max Black ed., 1962) (creating the label "essentially contested concepts"
for basic ideas whose definitions are subject to ceaseless disputes); see also Kimberl6
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color,43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).

1 See Harold R. Kerbo, Foreign Involvement in the Preconditionsfor Political
Violence: The World System and the Case of Chile, 22 J.CONFLICT RESOL. 363, 364 n. 1
(1978) (describing in detail the ongoing, contentious debate surrounding the definition of the
term political violence); see, e.g., ED CAIRNS, CHILDREN AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 11 (1996)
(defining political violence as "all those acts of an inter-group nature which are seen by those
on both sides, or on one side, to constitute violent behavior carried out in order to influence
power relations between the two sets of participants"); Donald G. Morrison & Hugh Michael
Stevenson, Political Instability in Independent Black Africa: More Dimensions of Conflict
Behavior by Nations, 15 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 347, 348 (1971) ("Politicalviolence is defined
as behavior characterized by the physical injury or subjection of persons or property with
intent to bring about an alteration in the structure of the political system."); Edward N.
Muller, A Test of a PartialTheory of Potentialfor Political Violence, 66 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
928, 928 (1972) (defining political violence as "violence directed against the regime (the
structure of political authority) and/or against particular authorities occupying positions in
the regime."); Alex Schmid, Terrorism on Trial: Terrorism-The Definitional Problem, 36
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 375 (2004) (detailing the various definitional characteristics of the
word terrorism, many of which overlap with political violence, as both are inherently
"politically motivated"); Kaethe Weingarten, Witnessing the Effects of Political Violence in
Families: Mechanisms of Intergenerational Transmission of Trauma and Clinical
Interventions, 30 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY 45, 49 (2004) ("As with many terms, the

definition of political violence is contested.").
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used to classify the term. Hibbs has classified political violence as behavior
that is (1) anti-system in character, (2) has political significance, and (3)
involves collective or "mass" activity.' 2 This includes, but is not limited to,
incidents of rioting, armed insurgency, and assassinations performed by
groups rather than individuals unconnected to a group. In his seminal work
on political violence, Ted Robert Gurr brings attention to the definitional
distinctions between types of violence labelled "physical," typified by the
use of 13force, and "structural," characterized by more general patterns of
denial.

By and large, the discourses concerning political violence have
been focused on state responses to violent actions that threaten, or seem to
threaten, state hegemony. Responses to such violence are usually motivated
by-and thus strongly correlated with-the level of threat acceptable to
maintain regime control relative to the violence experienced (or perceived
to be experienced). 14 Orthodox discourses about political violence include
violence between non-state actors (e.g., in-fighting between discrete
populations within a state). While such violence may not directly
undermine the legitimacy of the state, it may contribute to general intrastate
instability.
The centrality of the use of force to maintain or seek political power
is common to both violent conflict and regime repression. In both contexts,
the validity of force is invariably challenged. Authority (moral as well as
legal) for deploying violence to achieve political ends inevitably constitutes
a central aspect of the battle for political legitimacy between opposing
12DOUGLAS HIBBS, MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE

7 (1973).

13See Ted Robert Gurr, Patterns of Repression and Rebellion: Foundationsfor a
General Theory of PoliticalCoercion, in PERSISTENT PATTERNS AND EMERGENT STRUCTURES

INA WANING CENTURY 149, 152-161 (Margaret Karns ed., 1986).
Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State
Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 683,
683-713 (1995); Scott Sigmund Gartner & Patrick M. Regan, Threat and Repression: The
Non-Linear Relationship between Government and Opposition Violence, 33 J. PEACE RES.
273, 273-88 (1996). Notably, there is an emerging body of literature that examines the
relationship between political violence and elements of democracy. It had historically been
presumed that the democracies are more stable in nature since they do not, for the most part,
go to war. Newer research focused on the internal conflict within democracies demonstrates
that under this marker democracies are just as prone to violence as other types of states. See
G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES: PARTICIPATION, STABILITY, AND
VIOLENCE (1982); Matthew Krain, Contemporary Democracies Revisited Democracy,
Political Violence andEvent Count Models, 31 COMP. POL. STUD. 139, 164 (1998).
14

Christian

Davenport,
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parties. Language and definitional constructs are utilized by all parties in
the battle for political authority to justify their own use of violence and
delegitimize their opponent's use of violence."' 15 Once the conflict ends, or
the regime is ousted, this definitional contest continues and is central to
supporting and/or opposing the validity of the new order. Hence, definitions
of what acts constitute political violence are critical to the regime
change/conflict's end because certain violent acts gain political legitimacy
by inclusion in the definitional category. Such categorization also serves as
post facto justification for other acts taken pre-transition, thereby bolstering
political placement and influence during the transitional period. Practically,
it is of enormous significance when the political violence category is the
starting point for the legal discussions around which kinds of harmful acts
are to be subject to legal process, and which, by virtue of their acceptable
political status, will be excluded from the possibility of criminal sanction in
the accountability mechanisms that may follow political change. As this
Article explores, this complex range of vested interests associated with the
political violence category has significant influence on the exclusion of
harms to women from its definition.
B. The Definition of Terrorism
In all of this, the contemporary debates about the legitimate use of
violence to force political change within states, particularly those that are
undemocratic or unrepresentative, have been muddied by the parallel nexus
of violent terrorist tactics, in addition to many of the definitional markers
identified above. This is most apparent in debates around legitimacy for the
use of violence and the characterization of the legal status of combatants. In
this debate, political and legal legitimacy justifying the use of violence is
key and the terrain is obfuscated by a lack of clarity and definition
concerning the key term "terrorism." Equally important to flag in the
contemporary post-September 1 lth political reality is that the term
"political violence" has particular resonance, where the notion of "political
violence" cuts heavily across the language of anti-terrorism discourses.
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon; it has a long history in both
the national and international context. 16 However, the scale of attention
15 See generally MARGUERITE FEITLOWITZ, A LEXICON OF TERROR: ARGENTINA

AND THE LEGACIES OF TORTURE (1998) (describing the use of language in Argentina to

change descriptions of violence experienced during the military regime).
16See Charles A. Russell et al., Out-Inventing the Terrorist, in TERRORISM:
THEORY & PRACTICE (Yonah Alexander et al. eds., 1979); see also Sharon Harzenski,
Terrorism,A History: Stage 1, 12 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 137 (2003).
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generated by terrorism is a relatively modern phenomenon, as are the
attempts to regulate terrorist acts through international law. As early as
1937 the League of Nations had drafted the Convention for the Prevention
and Punishment of Terrorism.17 Upon its creation, the United Nations
inherited and sought to advance this work. In parallel, a number of regional
international organizations have addressed the manifestations of terrorism at
a national and regional level. These include the Council of Europe, 18 the
European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,
the African Union, and the Organization of American States. 19 Much of the
work by these bodies can be defined as attempts to agree upon suppression
conventions as well as cooperative regional action on a multitude of fronts.
Without more general discussion at this juncture, this Article suggests that
the suppression conventions stand as the natural result of a failure to agree
upon broader definitions of terrorism through enacting a generally agreed
upon multi-state treaty. 20 The lack of an agreed definition of terrorism both
within and between states means that the disputes about the boundaries
between political violence and terrorism are likely to be with us for some
time. Therefore, definitional uncertainty will continue to plague the
dividing line between these two categories, and the contestations over the

17 See League of Nations, Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Terrorism, (Nov. 16, 1937), League of Nations Doc. C.546(I).M.383(I).1937.V, reprintedin
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS, 1937-2001, at 71 (M. Cherif

Bassiouni ed., 2001).
18COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

(3rd ed. 2005).

19Organization of American States [OAS], Inter-American Convention Against
Terrorism, June 3, 2002, A.G. Res. 1840, OAS Doc.XXXII-O/02, entered intoforce July 10,
2003; Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, Declaration of San Salvador on
Strengthening Cooperation in the Fight Against Terrorism, OAS, OEA/Ser.L/ X.2.3 (Jan.
24, 2003). On June 13, 2002, the EU Council of Ministers adopted a Framework Decision on
the European Arrest Warrant. European Arrest Warrant Replaces Extradition Between EU
Member States, http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice home/fsj/criminal/extradition/fsj criminal
-extraditionen.htm (last visited March 26, 2006); see also OSCE Charter on Preventing and
Combating Terrorism, Org. for Security and Co-operation In Europe, Mc(I0).Jour/2 Annex
1, Dec. 7, 2002, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2002/12/1488_en.pdf,
Declaration of the Second High-Level Intergovernmental Meeting on the Prevention and
Combating of Terrorism in Africa, African Union, Mtg/HLIG/Conv.Terror/Decl. (1I) Rev. 2,.
Oct.

14,

2004,

available at http://www.africa-union.org/Terrorism/DECLARATION

%20Algiers%20REV.pdf.
See OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA Ni AOLAN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS ch. 7
(forthcoming 2006) (on file with author).
20
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legitimate use of force in situations of regime repression and internal
conflicts are unlikely to abate.
C. The Definition of Political Violence and Gender Violence
Some tentative conclusions can be drawn from the preceding
definitional discussions specific to our examination of the relationship
between gender and political violence in transitional contexts. First, the
discourse is overwhelmingly state-focused, with even the violence between
non-state parties representing a peripheral edge of the discussion. This
state-centric focus means that much of the intellectual and policy-driven
energy around defining and exploring the contours of political violence has
been focused on the relationship between violent acts (including the actors
perpetrating it) and the state as object of the action. There is very little room
in this discourse to tease out the extent to which gendered violence forms
part of the landscape when the state is actively engaged with and/or against
third party violence. Even more importantly, perhaps, it leaves little scope
to explore the extent to which dynamics of state and third party violence
affect the societal experiences of women more generally.
Second, there is a complete absence of any notion of private,
intimate violence forming part of the overall assessment or definitional
power in what constitutes political violence. There is also very little
analysis which seeks to explore the extent to which forms of anti-state
driven violence plays a role in encouraging and facilitating intimate
violence. Third, state use of formal collective violence is generally
privileged and there are formidable barriers to delegitimizing state use of
force (either domestically or externally). 2 ' This emphasis detracts from a
broader capacity to focus on the regulation of violence, in its myriad
manifestations, with consequences for the safety and security of women
more generally.
Fourth, as transitional processes address, to varying degrees, the
tense boundaries between the legitimate use of violence (defined as political
violence) versus criminal, terrorist, or morally impermissible violence,
gendered harms will struggle to find a space. As predominantly male actors
continue to dominate the processes of change where conceptual-and thus
political-boundaries are marked out, the view of political violence as
public, be it conflict or regime-related, in the narrowest sense will continue
to triumph. The requirement of this public element is intimately linked to
21 See

Kathleen A. Cavanaugh, Interpretationsof Political Violence in Ethnically

Divided Societies, 9 TERRORISM& POL. VIOLENCE 33, 33-54 (1997).
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broader nationalist or ethnic projects. Moreover, in this frame, much is
assumed about the "ordinary" nature of sex-based violations, and only
egregious sexual harms, as defined by key male elites, will be included.
This Article suggests that, when these core sexual harms are included, they
form, inter alia, part of a broader political objective, served at that juncture
by the inclusion of the sexual violation of women in the accountability or
narrative process. The myriad other harms experienced by women, and
outlined below, simply do not fit the frame and are typically excluded.
II. WHAT KINDS OF VIOLENCE DO WOMEN EXPERIENCE?
As I and others have noted elsewhere, "[o]nly relatively recently
has the gendered dimension of war, and of international law in particular,
been closely examined., 22 Moreover, " [t]his analysis has been
supplemented by consideration of the gender dynamics of ethnic conflict,
and internal conflict more generally.2 3 It also reveals that there is a tangible
link between the experience of women during conflict and the exclusions
identified in the transitional context.2 4
Women experience violence in multiple forms in many societies.
Violence is experienced in both the public and private spheres. Much of
feminist theory has rightly concentrated on bringing the sphere of private
intimate violence into the public domain and ensuring, in policy terms, that
its "private" categorization does not mean that it is therefore entirely
unregulated by the state.25 In conflicted societies, women remain vulnerable
22

ASKIN, supra note 3, at 12-17; Fionnuala Ni AolIin, Sex-based Violence and the

Holocaust-A Reevaluation of Harms and Rights in InternationalLaw, 12 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 43, 43-84 (2000).
23 Bell et al., Justice Discourses in Transition,supra note 1, at 320 (citing YUVALDAVIS, supra note 3, at 94.)
241d. (citing generally ASKrN, supra note 3; Ni Aoldin, Sex-based Violence and the

Holocaust, supra note 22).
25 See, e.g., Kelly Dawn Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other GenderRelated Crimes under InternationalLaw: ExtraordinaryAdvances, Enduring Obstacles, 21
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 288, 347 (2003) ("The gender jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR
will help in the struggle to ensure that gender crimes in other places ... are prosecuted and
punished."); Christine Chinkin & Kate Paradine, Vision and Reality: Democracy and
Citizenship of Women in the Dayton Peace Accords, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 103 (2001)
(discussing feminist interpretations of concepts such as democracy, citizenship, and human
rights within the gendered transitional context of the General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina); Bonita C. Meyersfeld, Reconceptualizing Domestic
Violence in International Law, 67 ALB. L. REV. 371 (2003) (utilizing a public/private
analysis to argue that domestic violence should be reconceptualized as torture under
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to intimate violence but are also, as has been extensively documented, the
target of sex-based violence that is intimately related to the methods and
means of warfare used by combatants. 26 International law has historically
avoided regulating such sex-based violence. As armed confrontations
between and within states was carried out by male combatants, the laws of
war were generally constructed from the point of view of a soldier who
needed ordered rules within which to wage war on behalf of the state.
Consequently, women's interests fared notoriously poorly when
accountability was sought for the behaviour of combatants. Accountability
for acts of violence directed at women during armed conflict has grown,2 7
but problems still persist.
First, despite legal reforms and increased accountability, there
remains a limited understanding of the forms and functionality of sex-based
violence in war, peace, and transition. Second, there remains ongoing
intellectual and legal resistance to accepting the extensive empirical
evidence that women's bodies have been specifically targeted to further
military-political objectives, and that traditional categorizations of violence,
as well as their appropriate sanctions, are ill-suited to deal with the
pervasiveness of violence experienced by women in multiple forms across a
wide range of societies. Finally, there has been little exploration of the
extent to which the violence that has been grafted on legal accountability
norms, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and serious
and systematic violations of human rights norms, actually maps onto
international law); Patricia Viseur Sellers & Kaoru Okuizumi, Intentional Prosecution of
Sexual Assaults, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45 (1997) (utilizing a public/private

analysis to address the mandate upon the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia to prosecute sexual assaults committed during the conflict and analyze the
Tribunal's obstacles in fulfilling the mandate).
26 This Article uses "sex-based violence" to mean a wide variety of violence and
victimizing acts directed at women because of their gender.
27

See Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1, Judgment

(Feb. 22, 2001); Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21, Judgment (Nov. 16, 1998);
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment (Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-I, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998). Indictments for rape have been
issued by the ICTR: Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse, & Nzirorera, Case No. ICTR-9844-I, Amended Indictment (Feb. 23, 2005); Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-00-55AI, Indictment (Nov. 11, 2000); Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Nzuwonemeye, & Sagahutu, Case
No. ICTR-00-56-I, Indictment (Sept. 25, 2002); Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-0172-I, Amended Indictment (June 15, 2005); Prosecutor v. Nzabirinda, Case No. ICTR-01-77I, Indictment (Dec. 6, 2001).

Political Violence and Gender

2006]

839

women's subjective experiences, and whether or not there are a range of
other experiences which women would name as violence but are not legally
categorized as such. 8 One firm conclusion is that extensive empirical work
is needed to measure more accurately women's experiences of violence and
to measure the gap between existing legal categories and what women name
as harms experienced by them in conflict and post-conflict situations.
III. WHAT KIND OF HARMS ARE ACCOUNTED FOR BY
TRANSITIONAL PROCESSES?
It is evident that societies coming out of conflict and/or moving
towards more democratic forms of governance have been at the forefront of
developing legal and other means to explore the effects of, record, and, in
certain contexts, create criminal liability for violations that have taken place
in their recent history. 29 This section briefly explores the extent to which
transitional justice discourse and the lived experience of transitional
accountability have gone beyond the international law responses to gross
violations of human rights. It also examines the extent to which transitional
processes have been able to give a more nuanced and meaningful narrative
of the multiple harms experienced by women. Specifically, this part of the
Article examines the extent to which political and legal processes, often
established to respond to the consequences of political violence, have
captured, or failed to capture, gender violence in their frame. While
reference will be made to a number of transitional justice mechanisms in
this context, it is important to qualify the analysis by recognizing the variety
of forms and institutional settings in which such accountability has been
sought; therefore, the comments reflect a level of general statement rather
than precision for all transitional accountability contexts.

28 The author's empirical work on gender-based violence and the Holocaust has
this link in the context of violence as experienced by women during the
demonstrated
clearly
Holocaust. See Ni AolIin, supra note 22, at 43-84.

29

See generally RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (1999); IMPUNITY AND

HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995);

Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a
PriorRegime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991); Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18 HUM.
RTS. Q. 249 (1996) (arguing that a hard line approach to human rights accountability when
negotiating fragile peace agreements is an impediment to both the process of ending conflict,
and potentially in conflict with the imperative to protect life by ending violence);
INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST KOSOVO, AND

CAMBODIA (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2004).
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A. The Politics of Transitional Accountability Measures
First, where transitional justice mechanisms are activated, they
generally form part of a package of measures designed to either stop
violence and/or encourage regime change. As such, they constitute, to some
degree, an inherently political response to what is generally a broader
political problem. In a context where the political climate of change is
dominated by group politics, whether ethnic or religious, vying for political
power, it seems evident that there will be an effect on the mechanisms
created to account for violations. This observation holds true across a
number of truth-telling processes where the definition of harms, sufficient
to activate examination by the truth commission or body, have a direct
relationship with the kinds of harms that were of most concern to those
elites now in position to mandate review and oversight. In this context,
harms experienced by women fare badly in the hierarchy of examination.
The Guatemalan peace process and ensuing truth-telling process
provide a good example. The Guatemalan Peace Accords brought an end to
more than thirty years of armed conflict between the Guatemalan
government and insurgent groups (URNG). It is noteworthy that the Peace
Accords took place in a society that has the most inequitable distribution of
wealth, income, and land ownership in Latin America, with about eighty
percent of the population living below the World Bank poverty standard.3 °
Guatemala established a National Reconciliation Commission,3 1 which
played a central political role in the verification process associated with the
enforcement of the peace process. Two particular kinds of human rights
violations dominated the discussions around accountability in Guatemala:
forced disappearances and extra-judicial executions. While not devaluing
the importance of review for these systematic violations, it is clear that the
emphasis on these acts reflects a hierarchy of harms, and a consensus
among the elite that these harms required review over all others. Arguably,
this reflects a capacity for such truth-telling processes to create and enforce
silences that exist in relation to other harms.
Furthermore, while forced disappearances were classified as a
crime in the state of Guatemala, there has been no state investigation into
30 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Fourth Report on the Situation
of Human Rights in Guatemala, 5, U.N. Doc. OEA/Ser.2/V/II.83 (1993).
31 COMMISSION ON HUMAN SECURITY, HUMAN SECURITY Now (2003), available at

http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/LGEL-5MCML7/$FILE/chs-securitymay03.pdfOpenElement.

Political Violence and Gender

2006]

past disappearances, nor, critically for women, was a provision made to
recognize the category of absence due to forced disappearance to facilitate
the civil affairs of family members.32 Given that those who disappeared
were predominantly male members of households, women were required to
assume tremendous practical responsibilities following such a forced
removal. The legal impediments operated particularly harshly, and
evidently contained fundamental gender biases, in the applicable legal
definitions as to who was considered to be a head of household. Finally, the
lack of recognition for the outworking of the disappeared category for
women underscores the point that the harm assumed was constructed from a
male rather than a female point of view.
B. The Elevation of Civil and Political Rights
The harms for which accountability is sought in most transitional
societies are invariably violations of civil and political rights. Within that
broad category, there are certain kinds of rights violations that have a higher
status than others. Most often, the process of transitional accountability
restricts itself to examining a narrow band of civil and political rights
violations, generally those related to direct physical violation of the
person's bodily integrity. There is a clear link between these harms and
those that neatly fit into categories of causality-hence their linkage with
political violence. These harms also frequently directly comprise those
rights considered immutable by international human rights law treaties.3 3
Vaskui Nesiah has described this as an inherent "bias" of transitional justice
accountability mechanisms. 34 The narrowing of defined harms will catch
some of the violations that women experience-though it has taken
substantial time and effort for women's particular experiences of sexual
violation to be recognized by international law and other criminal legal
32 This measure had been specifically recommended by the Commission on

Historical
MEMORY

Clarification.
OF SILENCE:

Recommendations, pt.
/reportlenglish/toc.html.

COMMISSION ON HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION,
GUATEMALA:
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION,

1,

27 (1999),

available at http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh

33 See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights, art. 15, Nov.
4, 1950,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/OO5.htm ("ECHR"). This
article specifics the right to life, the right to be free from torture, freedom from slavery, and
freedom from ex-post facto laws as the sole non-derogable rights under the ECHR.

34 See generally Vasuki Nesiah, Discussion Lines on Gender and Transitional
Justice: An Introductory Essay Reflecting on the ICTJ Bellagio Workshop on Gender and
Transitional Justice, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 799 (2006).

842

Columbia Journalof Gender andLaw

[Vol. 15:3

processes that have recently become a feature of the transition projects in
many states. Often, however, naming certain violations as privileged for the
purposes of public accountability (the list may often include torture, extrajudicial killing, disappearances, and acts which can be defined as gross and
systematic violations of human rights) will leave untouched the myriad
experiences that women might describe as the pivotal experiences of
violation they endured. As Nthabiseng Motsemme has affirmed: "Various
studies exploring the ways ordinary women speak about their traumatic
pasts under violent regimes have consistently shown how they tend to place
their narratives
within everyday lived experience, rather than nationalist
35
concerns."
Moreover, the forms and places of violation that may be of
particular significance to women may simply not be recognized by
accountability mechanisms as such. For example, the El Salvador transition,
and its preceding peace process, has been vaunted for the centrality of
human rights to the inter-party negotiations. 36 Final peace accords were
signed in 1992 and included a provision for an Ad Hoc Commission to
engage in a process of lustration with the military and the formation of a
Truth Commission to examine past human rights abuses.37 The El Salvador
conflict was characterized by human rights and humanitarian law violations
committed by both state and non-state actors.

35 Nthabiseng Motsemme, The Mute Always Speak: On Women 's Silences at the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 52 CURRENT SOCIOLOGY 905, 909 (2004); see also
LUISA PASSERINI, MEMORY AND TOTALITARIANISM (1992); FIONA Ross, BEARING WITNESS:

WOMEN AND THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA 50 (2003);

Veena Das, The Act of Witnessing: Violence, Poisonous Knowledge and Subjectivity, in
VIOLENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY (Veena Das et al. eds., 2000); JUDITH N. ZUR, VIOLENT
MEMORIES: MAYAN WIDOWS IN GUATEMALA (1998).
36

El Salvador Agreement on Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex,

Agenda Item 34, U.N. Doc. A/44/971- S/21541 (July 26, 1990).
37

See generally COMMISSION ON THE TRUTH FOR EL SALVADOR, FROM MADNESS TO
HOPE: THE 12-YEAR WAR IN EL SALVADOR: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE TRUTH FOR
EL SALVADOR, UN Doc. S/25500, Apr. 1, 1993, available at http://documents.un.org (Upon

entering
the
website
to
the
Official
Document
System
of
the
United Nations, select "Simple Search." In the space provided for "Full Text Search," enter
the phrase "Commission on the Truth for El Salvador. Upon receiving the search results,
select the hyperlink to "S/25500" at the bottom of the page. This selection will link you to
the paginated, English version of the Report that is cited to by this Article). [hereinafter EL
SALVADOR REPORT].
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The Truth Commission was charged with investigating both
individual incidents of violence and a series of cases that revealed a
systematic pattern of abuse, but stressed that these types of violent acts
were not necessarily "mutually exclusive. 3 8 In presenting its report, the
Commission noted the limitations to investigation of violence on such a
large scale, and suggested that cases had been chosen based on their
representative nature. The Commission was also given the power to make
general recommendations that "may include measures to prevent the
repetition of such acts, and initiatives to promote national reconciliation. 3 9
The report of the El Salvador Commission determined what violent acts
would be classified as most serious. The report itself states that, "[c]learly,
not every violation of a right guaranteed in those instruments [ICCPR,
American Convention] can be characterised as a 'serious act of violence.'
Those instruments themselves recognise that some violations are more
serious than others. ' 4° The report then goes on to characterize those acts
described as a "serious act of violence" as those from which no derogation
is permitted-thereby determining prioritization based on the text of the
treaties themselves. The Commission concludes "it is appropriate, therefore,
that the Commission should classify the seriousness of each 'act of
violence' on the basis of the rights which the two instruments list as not
being subject to derogation, in particular,
rights related directly to the rights
'
"
integrity.'
physical
to
and
to life
The Commission report does not include any consideration of the
social context of the events it investigated. Group harm is taken to mean
similar acts perpetrated on a number of persons, therefore making them
representative of the overall situation, rather than exploring the widest
range of harms that resulted from such acts. Women, where they are
included in the report, are named by virtue of having been victims of the
38

Id. at 19.

39Id. at 17. (quoting the Annex to the Mexico Agreement of 27 April, 1990, The
United Nations and El Salvador, 1990-1995, 17, 4, UN Doc. A/46/553-S/23130, available

athttp://documents.un.org (Upon entering the website to the Official Document System of
the United Nations, select "Simple Search." In the space provided for "Full Text Search,"
enter the phrase "Mexico Agreement" and the date "27/04/90." Upon receiving the search
results, select the hyperlink to "A/46/553" at the bottom of the page. This selection will link
you to the paginated, English version of the Annex, which is cited herein)).
40 EL SALVADOR
41Id. at 21.

REPORT, supra note 37,

at 20.
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same "serious act of violence" as men, resulting in harms that come within
the scope of the definition. Evidently, at the heart of the Commission's
preoccupations were violations of civil and political rights, and within those
terms of reference, those rights that were particularly focused on bodily
harms.
C. Transitional Accountability Processes Uphold the Public/Private
Dichotomy
A third feature of transitional accountability is the marked emphasis
on public acts for the purposes of recording, as well as constructing, a
societal narrative, while private acts are simultaneously neglected. What
generally matters is what occurred on streets, in public spaces and in formal
institutional settings. For violations occurring within the home, or close to
private intimate spaces that women themselves describe as central to their
experiences of vulnerability, lack of security and violation are deemed to
fall within the "private" domain in most legal and social systems, and
frequently outside the circle of notice and accountability. Thus, what
happens within people's homes is not deemed important and is often
entirely invisible.42
It is also evident that the exclusion of harms
experienced in the home (or domestic context) emphasizes the importance
of the overarching political context in the transitional justice setting, and the
under-charted relationship between political settlements, political violence,
and political accountability. This is particularly true when we consider the
public message that "private" gendered (and/or domestic) violence
communicates in transitional societies. It says that private violence between
certain non-state actors is not of interest to the accountability process. This
statement sends out a very specific message about gender roles and gender
inequality for the larger society. In consequence, there is a knock-on effect
on full democratic and citizenship participation for victims who remain
unrecognised by broader political processes, and outside the sphere of full
political and legal inclusion.
42

For example, there is an extensive literature on the experiences of Indian Sikhs

following the assassination of Indira Ghandi (Oct. 31 1984), specifically in New Delhi. As
Anmit Srinivasan notes: "The violation of the home, whether religiously or domestically
defined, formed a common thread in the Sikhs' own perception of Operation Bluestar (a
military action) as an outrage of essentially the same order as the November killings (a
populist action)." Amrit Srinivasan, The Survivor in the Study of Violence, in MIRRORS OF
VIOLENCE: COMMUNITIES, RIOTS AND SURVIVORS IN SOUTH ASIA 305, 311 (Veena Das ed.,
1990).
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D. The Avoidance of Transitional Accountability
An important and final matter to consider is that some societies
have deliberately chosen not to seek accountability in the post-conflict
and/or regime change context. Mozambique provides an interesting lens for
this approach. By 1992, after sixteen years of bloody civil conflict, with
massive loss of life, the creation of over four million refugees, and the
economic effects of conflict, both state and non-state parties were prepared
to sit at the negotiation table.43 A General Peace Accord was affirmed in
October 1992. This Accord is notable because, while it deals with issues of
military, political, and humanitarian concern, it almost entirely excludes
provisions for dealing with grave and systematic human rights violations by
all sides. Some have argued that the lack of provision for accountability was
recognition of the sober political reality that the key concern was an end to
violence (meaning specifically the violence between the parties at the
negotiation table) and that the negotiations were too fragile to endanger by
including human rights wholesale in the transition arrangements. Notably,
no truth commission was established and no provisions were made to indict
or prosecute war criminals.
There has been no analysis of the extent to which there were any
gender differences in the general view that it was better to "move on" than
to remain pre-occupied with accounting for the past. Bartoli has argued that
a Western judgment on this question of conflict end versus accountability
(peace versus justice, if you will) may be different from a Mozambican
view, or even an African view. 4 This is an important question, but it
requires a further refinement-namely, what a gendered African or
Mozambican view of accountability would be and how that might differ
from the views of the male elites negotiating the cessation of violence.
Particularly, some writing on Mozambique has stressed the uniquely
African modes of accommodation. For example, Lundin has stressed the
importance of such methods as reconciliation and re-insertion of persons
back into the community (particularly ex-combatants). 45 While not doubting
the authenticity of the specific cultural viewpoint, it remains obvious that
this approach also glosses over any specific issues of gender differences
43 See Andrea Bartoli, Learningfrom the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of
the Community of Sant'Egidio, in PAVING THE WAY: CONTRIBUTIONS OF INTERACTIVE
CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO PEACEMAKING 79 (Ronald J. Fisher ed., 2005).
44 Id. at

98-100.

45 See Ira Baptista Lundin, Mechanisms of Community Reception of Demobilised
Soldiers in Mozambique, 3 AFR. J. POL. SCI. 104-18 (1998).

Columbia Journalof Gender and Law

[Vol. 15:3

around such accommodation. In particular, this issue is highly fraught for
women when the question of combatant re-integration is promoted, as such
individuals may have been, and may continue to be, responsible for the
most heinous of intimate violent crimes, and their re-introduction to a
community presupposes no particular hindrances for women. It also
presupposes no specific difficulties for female ex-combatants who are
attempting to reintegrate into communities which before, during, and after
transition manifest strong patriarchal and conservative aspects. A political
compromise over the limits of accountability for what elites agree to be a
line drawn on "political violence" can fundamentally fail to engage with the
harms that fall outside the realm of the agreed d6tente, or ultimately, may
reflect a failure to sufficiently discriminate between the forms of harms
experienced.
IV. POLITICAL COMPROMISE AND OTHER TRANSITIONAL
ISSUES
It is also useful to note that a number of other intersecting issues
arise for women in the post conflict/successor regime context. The matters
that are generally agreed by elite male actors at the negotiation table have a
substantial effect on the capacity of gender to be a meaningful point of
reflection or inclusion in transitional legal and political landscapes.
For example, disarmament frequently constitutes a core element of
transition processes. Its presence or absence poses complex questions with
respect to deconstructing the notion of political violence from a gender
perspective. Key issues to be posed here include, first, that what may
constitute disarmament sufficient to satisfy a ceasefire may not in fact entail
the removal of all such weapons from the public, and more importantly, the
private sphere. Second, a perhaps trite but true observation is that the
disarmament of weapons is not the disarmament of minds. Therefore, the
underlying social and psychological dimensions of a conflicted society that
have supported the resort to violence, and the elevation of particular forms
of masculinity that accompany it, are not in any sense undermined or
addressed by a formal disarmament process. Thus, a key issue to be
addressed concerning violence in conflict zones is what is meant by the
term "ending violence." In the parlance of ending public violence or
internal conflict, this conversation revolves around decommissioning
weapons and getting armed paramilitaries/insurgents to swap violent
contestation for peaceful debate about contested issues. However, this kind
of discussion rarely engages with the fundamental requirement of changing
attitudes toward the use of violence. Attitudinal change is critical and
undervalued. For women, it means that, while guns may physically no
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longer be present in public spaces, the social psychology that made the use
of violence acceptable, whether in the private or public sphere, does not
change.
The complexities of the disarmament discussion underscore the
important point that an emphasis on direct physical violence tends to
exclude the relevance of the language of security for women. The term
"security" is not without its problems; namely, that the discourse on
security has been state-based and infused with a militaristic and
paternalistic perspective. However, amongst others, the Commission on
Human Security (2003) has started to move the discourse to a more
inclusive basis, beginning with the premise that achieving human security
requires not only protection, but also a strategy to empower people to fend
for themselves. 46 A real and pressing question is whether we consider
massive economic deprivation as a security threat, particularly when those
made most vulnerable in most societies as a result of such deprivations are
women and children. In that context, the Secretary-General of the U.N. has
recently stated in his report, Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, that the relationship between massive
economic deprivation and violence needs to be more carefully considered in
transitional processes.4 7 Reflection on security in a transitional context
should make us consider the extent to which an emphasis on ending or
containing political violence per se constitutes a full and thorough response
to the multitudes of harms that both accompany and survive past the ending
of formal political and military hostilities between rival factions.
In expanding our conceptualization of security and in addressing
specific harms experienced by women, both during and after the formal
ending of conflict/changeover of regime, a key concern is domestic and
intimate violence. This issue has been raised in many societies in the
transitional phase; particular examples include South Africa and Northern
Ireland.4 8 One obvious quandary raised by some empirical assessment is
that reported domestic and intimate violence rates increase after the end of
46 HUMAN SECURITY Now, supra note 3 1.

47 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, delivered to the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).

48 See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman, Theories of Domestic Violence in the African
Context, II AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 847, 856-57 (2003) (describing the "society
in transition" theory of domestic violence within the South African context).
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conflict. 49 However, this specific empirical finding may be more complex

than it initially appears. Williams has argued that domestic violence
experienced by women during conflict may be more severe in its form
because, particularly in ethno-national conflicts, the resort to external
mediation of such violence (e.g., access to police) may have been entirely
absent.50 Thus, increased reporting at the end of conflict may not mean
absolute statistical increases in violence per se. Rather, it may simply mean
that reporting is possible where it was previously impossible, despite the
fact that many forms of violence may remain unacknowledged. However,
what is more generally evident, at least on preliminary empirical
assessment, is that the post-conflict or transitional phase holds as many, if
not more, quandaries of accountability for women, rarely addressed either
by accountability processes or by the legal and institutional rebuilding that
often frames the broader political transformations that are being advanced.
It is also evident that such violence is rarely if ever considered political in
nature, and often falls entirely outside the immediate mechanisms of
accountability established in the changeover phase. Given the pervasiveness
of intimate and domestic violence and strong anecdotal evidence that it has
a heightened appearance and effect in societies which are in crisis (for
whatever reason), there are very good reasons why it should not be
excluded from the formal accountability and truth-telling processes put in
place as part of the transitional compact. Indeed, there are important reasons
to explore in such formal settings what the experiences and forms of such
violence tell us about the relationship between political violence
experienced in a society more broadly and the manifestations it takes in the
domestic setting for women.
V. CONCLUSION
The absence of women in the processes of transition has become a
matter of preoccupation in international circles. Indeed, we now have an
important and highly visible U.N. Resolution 1325, which "urges U.N.
Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision49

id.

50 See MONICA MCWILLIAMS ET AL., TAKING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SERIOUSLY:

103 (1996) (noting that "most women
who reported no police action came from West Belfast and other nationalist areas.") (citing
ISSUES FOR THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

MONICA MCWILLIAMS & JOAN McKIERNAN, BRINGING IT OUT IN THE OPEN: DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1993)).
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making levels . . . for the prevention, management and resolution of

conflict.",5' Its requirements are framed by the acknowledgement that
women play an important role in "the prevention and resolution of conflict
and in peacemaking" and that "women and children constitute the vast
majority of those affected by armed conflict., 52 The resolution mandates
that all actors involved in negotiating and implementing peace agreements
adopt a gender perspective, which in theory and practice ought to consist of
inclusion in framing and creating the accountability mechanisms for
"political" violence in post-conflict societies. Notwithstanding this highly
visible and symbolic resolution, it remains the case that women's rights are
generally the most ignored and under-enforced category of norms in a
transitional context. Women will often have been at the forefront of peace
initiatives throughout a conflict, or the face of a call for state accountability
for human rights violations, such as the Mothers of the Disappeared in
Argentina or the visible face of the Peace People in Northern Ireland, but
peace agreements and transitions are negotiated predominantly by men.
This reality results in a domination of transitional justice discourse by men.
Gender-sensitive research across transitional societies suggests that
women have an expansive notion of what and where transformation is
required, and it is not limited to the public domains that so often
monopolize peace agreements and transitional deals between internal
political factions. Women's notions of accountability and harms also
manifest a clearly different conceptualisation than the gendered approach
that dominates the peace deals and transition mechanisms that pervade
transitional societies. Women experience both the public and private aspects
of an authoritarian society and/or conflicted society, and they articulate the
need to transform politics and practice in both contexts. Once again, the
lived experience of women in conflicted societies suggests that the term
"transition" has much more territory to occupy than it has hitherto, and that
much work is needed to both ground and empirically quantify this
difference.

51S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 5, at 1.
52

Id.

